The Value of Verifiable Information in a Controversial Market: Evidence from Lab Auctions of Genetically Modified Food by Rousu, Matthew et al.
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) Economics
2002
The Value of Verifiable Information in a
Controversial Market: Evidence from Lab Auctions
of Genetically Modified Food
Matthew Rousu
Iowa State University
Wallace Huffman
Iowa State University, whuffman@iastate.edu
Jason F. Shogren
University of Wyoming
Abebayehu Tegene
United States Department of Agriculture
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rousu, Matthew; Huffman, Wallace; Shogren, Jason F.; and Tegene, Abebayehu, "The Value of Verifiable Information in a
Controversial Market: Evidence from Lab Auctions of Genetically Modified Food" (2002). Economics Working Papers (2002–2016).
247.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/247
 IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY  
   
The Value of Verifiable Information in a 
Controversial Market: Evidence from Lab 
Auctions of Genetically Modified Food  
Matthew Rousu, Wallace Huffman, Jason F. Shogren, 
Abebayehu Tegene  
September  2002  
   
Working Paper # 02003  
  
Department of Economics 
Working Papers Series 
 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Rousu, Wallace E. Huffman, Jason F. Shogren, and Abebayehu Tegene.  All rights 
reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, 
national origin, sexual orientation, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a 
U.S. Vietnam Era Veteran.  Any persons having inquiries concerning this may contact the 
Director of Affirmative Action, 1031 Wallace Road Office Building, Room 101, 515-294-7612. 
The Value of Verifiable Information in a Controversial Market:
Evidence from Lab Auctions of Genetically Modified Food
Matthew Rousu, Wallace E. Huffman, Jason F. Shogren, and Abebayehu Tegene
February 25, 2002
The authors are graduate student, Department of Economics, Iowa State University; professor,
Department of Economics, Iowa State University; Stroock distinguished professor of natural
resource conservation and management, Department of Economics and Finance, University of
Wyoming; and Senior Economist, Food and Rural Economics Division, ERS, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, respectively.
Copyright 2001 by M. Rousu, W. E. Huffman, J. F. Shogren, and A. Tegene.  All Rights
Reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by
any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the USDA under Cooperative
Agreement No. 43-3AEL-8-80125, the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension
Service, USDA, under Grant No. 00-52100-9617, and the Iowa Agriculture and Home
Economics Experiment Station.  Also, we thank Wayne Fuller and Phil Dixon in the Department
of Statistics for assistance with the statistical experimental design, Walt Fehr and John
Miranowski for helpful suggestions and comments, and Monsanto for providing food products.
The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent the views or policies of the USDA.
1Abstract
Two interested parties dominate the current debate on genetically modified (GM) foods:
environmental groups and agribusiness companies.  For the average consumer to arrive at an
informed decision on these new foods, they must rely on information from interested parties.
Unfortunately, information from interested parties does not provide an accurate picture of the
benefits and risks of new products.  This paper examines the effects of information on
consumers’ demand for new food products, GM-foods, in an environment where information
from one or more interested parties is provided. We design and conduct laboratory auction
experiments using randomly chosen adult consumers from two large metropolitan areas who are
grouped into twelve experimental units and subjected to six randomly assigned information
treatments.  We find that in this environment, verifiable information has a small but positive
value to sample consumers, and the projected annual social value to all processed foods
consumed is relatively large for this public good. Such a large potential value may make it
worthwhile for the United States to establish a new third party institution that would produce and
distribute verifiable information on GM food.
21.  Introduction
R&D frequently leads to the development of new inputs and consumer goods, and the
introduction of new products, e.g., foods, can lead to information wars as interested parties try to
influence market outcomes.  Two groups dominate the debate over genetically modified (GM)
foods.  These groups have very different ideas or beliefs about the benefits and risks of
agricultural biotechnology.  Agribusiness companies like Monsanto and Syngenta support
agricultural biotechnology and say that GM foods will help protect the environment, increase
nutrition, and help end world hunger (Council for Biotechnology Information, 2001).
Environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth oppose agricultural
biotechnology and say that GM foods could cause allergic reactions, will hurt the environment,
and could increase the power of multinational companies (Greenpeace, 2001).  One could
characterize the on-going GM-food controversy as an information war between the pro- and anti-
biotech interest groups.  The average U.S. consumer and farmer has available to him (her)
diverse information from these interested parties as they makes decisions on the use of GM
products.  Socially good or bad decisions may result.  Huffman and Tegene (2002) have
hypothesized that independent, third-party information, or verifiable information, might improve
social welfare in this environment.  Decision-makers can profit from access to impartial
information about the likely risks and benefits of genetic modification.
This paper examines the effects of information on consumers’ demand for new food
products, GM-foods, in an environment where information from one or more interested parties is
provided.  Four issues are examined. First, how does diverse information from interested parties
affect consumers’ willingness to pay for genetically modified foods?  Second, does third-party or
verifiable information on genetic modification, in an environment where pro- or (and) anti-
3biotech information is provided, change consumers’ purchasing behavior?  Third, if behavior
changes, what is the value of verifiable information to consumers?  Fourth, if we generalize our
results to the aggregate U.S. demand for processed foods, what is the approximate annual social
value?
 To address these issues, we design and conduct a set of laboratory auction experiments
on randomly chosen adult consumers from two large metropolitan areas who are grouped into
twelve experimental unit and subjected to six randomly assigned information treatments.  In
designing the experiments, we combine the best attributes of statistical experimental design and
experimental economics to obtain a superior overall experimental design.  Our empirical analysis
of the experimental data shows that the release of pro- and anti-biotech information affects bid
prices in the expected direction; the release of pro- and anti-biotech information together leads to
intermediate bid prices, i.e., anti-biotech information does not dominate pro-biotech information
when it is present; and when pro- or anti-biotech information is present, the release of third-party
or verifiable information is a moderating force on willingness to pay.  Finally, we show that the
value of verifiable information to sample consumers is small, but positive, and when we venture
to extend our results to cover annual sales of U.S. processed foods, verifiable information on
genetic modification, treated as a public good, has a large annual social value. Hence, we
conclude that the U.S. should explore in much greater detail the design of a new independent
institution to produce and distribute verifiable information on genetic modification of foods.
2.   Experimental Design
With two interested parties injecting diverse information into in a controversial market,
what are rational consumers likely to do?  Ideally, these buyers will make informed decisions
provided they are (a) sophisticated enough to understand the technical processes at work and to
4recognize that interested parties’ supply information tainted by a political agenda, and (b) they
can verify all the information provided (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).  Unfortunately, this full
and verifiable information environment does not define the market for genetically modified
products.  Genetic modification is a complex process, which involves taking genes from one
organism and placing them into another.  Most consumers do not know the intricate details of
this process.  In addition, not all GM information is currently verifiable.  Also, the search costs
for most consumers to find neutral information is very high, as there are contradictory messages
about GM as “food to feed the planet” versus GM as “frankenfood” (see for example Gates,
2001).  Because of these high search costs, a verifiable information source – defined as a source
that has no financial ties to genetic modification and produces information that is verifiable –
could have tremendous consumer value (Huffman and Tegene, 2002).
Limited evidence from earlier surveys and the lab suggests that consumers only hear the
bad news in a controversial market with diverse information and without verifiable information.
Individuals amplify the risks of a neoteric product and discount its benefits.  Viscusi (1997), for
instance, showed using a survey that when consumers received divergent information on
environmental risks, they put greater weight on the expert who provided a high-risk assessment.
They did so regardless of whether the low-risk assessment came from a government or an
industry source.  A similar “alarmist” reaction to a new product was also observed in Fox,
Hayes, and Shogren’s (2001) lab auction experiment on the value of food irradiation.  Their
initial results follow intuition: a favorable description of irradiation increased demand and an
unfavorable description decreased demand.  But when presented with both a favorable and
unfavorable description, demand fell to zero, suggesting the negative portrayal dominated the
positive.   Bidders bid as if they had only heard the anti-irradiation argument, despite the fact that
5the negative information was presented by a consumer advocacy group and was presented in a
non-scientific manner.
Consistent with several models of choice under risk (e.g., loss aversion, status quo bias,
Bayesian updating), this result illustrates the incentive for partisan groups to promote
unscientific claims for their personal gain and for loss in welfare of others.  The open question
that neither the Viscusi nor Fox, Hayes, and Shogren studies address is the potential social value
of introducing third party verifiable information about the risks and benefits of the controversial
products for sale in the market.  One attempt to estimate the value of such information was
Foster and Just’s (1989) study on how news of insecticide contamination (heptachlor) affected
milk consumption in Hawaii.  Foster and Just calculated the value of third party information as
the difference in rational consumers’ choices under incomplete and more complete information.
They estimated the value of information as about $10.00 per person per month.  Foster and Just
did not, however, control for the type of information as a treatment variable.  This will
distinguish our experimental design from theirs.
We design our experiment to incorporate the private-information-revealing feature of
experimental auction markets like Fox et al. (2001) and the rigorous randomized treatment
effects of statistical experimental design.  The experimental design consisted of six biotech
information-labeling treatments with two replications.  The treatments are randomly assigned to
twelve experimental units, each consisting of 13 to 16 consumers drawn from the households of
two major urban areas and who are paid to participate.  Each participant participated in two
trials.1  Using randomly chosen consumers from the population of an urban area, rather than
undergraduate college students at a university, is a advantage when it comes to drawing
inferences from the experiments or generalizing to the Midwest or whole U.S. population.
6Consumers might react differently to GM content in different types of food or they may
have no demand for some food products.  Using only one food item seemed unlikely to reveal
enough information, given the sizeable fixed cost of conducting the experiment.  Three food
items were chosen: vegetable oil (made from soybeans), tortilla chips (made from yellow corn),
and Russet potatoes.  In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all of the
proteins (which are the components of DNA and the source of genetic modification) are removed
leaving pure lipids.  Minimal human health concerns should arise from GM oil, but consumers
may either worry that GM soybeans affect the environment or lack adequate information on the
distilling process.  Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that may be made from GM or non-
GM corn, and consumers might have human health and environmental concerns.  Russet
potatoes are purchased as a fresh product and are generally baked or fried before eating.  Similar
to tortilla chips, consumers might see both human health and environmental risks from eating
GM-Russet potatoes.
Auctions were conducted at two Midwestern U.S. cities: Des Moines, IA, and St. Paul,
MN.  Participants in the auctions were consumers in these two areas who were contacted by the
Iowa State University Statistics Laboratory and agreed to participate in the study.  The Statistics
Laboratory obtained 1,200 to 1,500 randomly selected residence telephone numbers from each of
the metropolitan areas.  Employees of the ISU Statistics Laboratory called these numbers to
make sure that the phone number was for a residence.  The employees then asked to speak to an
adult in the household (individual who was 18 years of age or older).  They were told that Iowa
State University was looking for people who were willing to participate in a group session in Des
Moines (St. Paul) that relates to how people select food and household products.  The sessions
were held on Saturday, April 7th (April 21st) and participants were informed that the session
7would last about 90 minutes.  Each participant was told that they would receive $40 in cash for
their time.  The sessions were held at the Iowa State University Learning Connection, 7th and
Locust, Des Moines (lower level of the Classroom Office Building, University of Minnesota, St.
Paul).  Three different times were available each auction day, 9 a.m., 11:30 p.m., and 2 p.m., and
willing participants were asked to choose a time that best fit their schedule. Participation per
household was limited to two adult individuals, and they were assigned to different groups.2  To
willing participants, the Statistics Laboratory followed up by sending a letter containing more
information, including a map and instructions on when and where the meeting would be held,
how to get there, and a telephone number to contact for more information.
There were twelve experimental units, six in Des Moines, and six in Minneapolis.
Twelve hundred people in Des Moines were called and 99 of them agreed to participate.  Of
those 99 people who agreed to participate, 77 did indeed attend.  For the Minneapolis
experiments, 1,500 people were called and 118 people agreed to participate.  Of those 118, we
had 95 participants in the Minneapolis experiments.  The total sample size is 172, which is large
compared to most experimental auctions.
Each auction had ten steps, which are summarized in figure 1.3  When participants
arrived at the lab, they signed a consent form to agree to participate in the auction.  After they
signed this form, they were given $40 for participating and an ID number to preserve their
anonymity.  The participants then read a brief set of instructions and filled out a questionnaire.
Step 2 introduced the auction.  We used a random nth price auction in this experiment
(Shogren et al., 2001).  The advantages of the random nth price auction are that it is demand
revealing in theory and the auction attempts to engage bidders at all locations along the demand
curve.4  The random nth-price works as follows:  Each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit of
8a good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered from highest to lowest.  The auction monitor then
selects a random number which is drawn from a uniform distribution between 2 and k; and the
monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the (n-1) highest bidders at the nth-price.  For
instance, if the monitor randomly selects n = 5, the four highest bidders each purchase one unit
of the good priced at the fifth-highest bid.  Ex ante, bidders who have low or moderate valuations
now have a nontrivial chance to buy the good because the price is determined randomly.  This
auction increases the odds that insincere bidding will lead to a loss.   Participants were given
detailed instructions on the random nth-price auction, including an example written on the board.
After the participants learned about the auction, a short quiz was given to ensure that everyone
understood how the auction worked.
Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, where participants bid on a brand-name
candy bar.  The participants were asked to examine the product and then place a (sealed) bid on
the candy bar.  The bids were collected and the first round of practice bidding was over.
Throughout the auction, when the participants were bidding on items in a particular round, they
had no indication of what other items they may be bidding on in future rounds or if additional
rounds would occur.
Step 4 was the second practice round of bidding.  In this round the participants bid
separately on three different items.  The three products were the same brand-name candy bar, a
deck of playing cards and a box of pens.  The consumers were asked to examine the three
products in practice round two and make bids on the products.  Then the bids were collected.
Only one of the two rounds was chosen as binding (valid), so that participants would not take
home more than one of any product.  The reason was to eliminate price reduction due to the
consumer buying a larger quantity because of diminishing marginal utility of these products (i.e.,
9lower prices due to a consumer’s negatively sloped demand curve).5  Participants were informed
that only one of the two rounds would bind before step 3 and were reminded of this again before
step 4.
After the two practice auction rounds were completed, the binding round and the binding
nth-prices were revealed in step 5.  All of the bids were written on the blackboard, and the nth-
prices were circled for each of the three products.  Participants could see what items they won
immediately, and the market-clearing price.  The participants were notified that all purchases of
goods would take place after the experiment was over, so that all exchanges of money for goods
would take place at the end of the session.
In step 6, information about biotechnology was released to the participants.  The possible
types of information a participant could receive were: (1) the industry perspective—a collection
of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group of leading
biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta; (2) the environmental group
perspective—a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group; and (3) the third-party, verifiable perspective—a
statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, consisting of a variety of
individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified goods, including scientists, professionals,
religious leaders, and academics, none of whom have a financial stake in genetically modified
foods.  To assist the participants process these different sources of information, the volume of
information released of each type was limited to one 8 1/2" x 11" page, and it was organized into
five categories: general information, scientific impact, human impact, financial impact, and
environmental impact, to ease the information processing load on participants.  Figures 3, 4, and
5 show the exact wording of the three types of information about genetically modified food.
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The information was randomized to create six treatments of information combinations:
pro-biotechnology information; anti-biotechnology information; both pro and anti-biotechnology
information;6 pro-biotechnology and third party, verifiable information; anti-biotechnology and
third-party,7 verifiable information; and pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and third-party,
verifiable information.  These six combinations were randomized among all twelve experimental
units, with each information combination going to two experimental units.
Two auction rounds followed the distribution of information. One of the two rounds had
the participants bid on food products with just a standard food label.  The other round had
participants bid on the same food products with the same label, except there was a sentence
added indicating that the food had been genetically engineered.  These labels were made as plain
as possible to avoid any influence on the bids from the label design (see Figure 2).  The
sequencing of GM labels was randomized across experimental units.  Each combination of
information was given to two experimental units.  One of these experimental units bid on food
with the standard label in round one, and the food with the label indicating genetic modification
in round two.  The other experimental unit bid on food with the label indicating genetic
modification in round one, and the standard label in round two.  For each experimental unit, only
one of the two food rounds was chosen as the binding (valid) round.  This avoided the problem
of bid prices being reduced as consumers moved along their demand curve.
In step 7, participants bid on three different food products: a bag of potatoes, a bottle of
vegetable oil, and a bag of tortilla chips.  The participants were instructed to examine the three
products and then write down their (sealed) bid for each of the three goods.  Participants bid on
each good separately.  Then the bids were collected from the individuals, and the participants
were informed that they were about to look at another group of food items.
11
Step 8 had participants come examine the same three food products, but with the different
labels (the second trial).  After the participants examined the products, they were instructed to
bid on the three products.  Each good was bid on separately.  The bids were then collected from
all of the participants.  Once again, consumers were informed that only one of the two trials or
bidding rounds would bind before step 7, and they were told this again before step 8.8
Step 9 consisted of the selection of which of the two trials would be chosen as binding,
along with the binding nth-prices.  After the binding round and binding nth prices were revealed,
the winners were notified and the participants were asked to complete a brief post-auction
questionnaire.  In step 10, the participants who did not win any products were informed that they
were free to leave, and the participants who won products exchanged money for their goods, and
then they were free to leave.
3.   Empirical specification I: Consumer demand under diverse information
Following Viscusi and Evans (1990), we begin our empirical specification by first
developing a state-dependent utility model of GM food consumption given diverse information.
A person compares his perceived expected utility (henceforth, utility) from consuming GM-
labeled foods and plain-labeled foods.  These two goods are nearly perfect substitutes, in which
consumption can result in either a good or bad outcome, with distinct probabilities9. Equation (1)
shows the state-dependent utility function for a consumer who purchases GM-labeled food,
called labeled; equation (2) is his utility for a purchase of plain-labeled foods, called non-
labeled:
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )wVIpwUIpwEU jjlabeledjjlabeledjlabeled −+= 1)(
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )MwVpMwUpMwEU jj labelednonjj labelednonj labelednon −−+−=− −−− 1)( .
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where consumer j’s income is w, and M is the monetary premium he pays for the non-labeled
food (the premium can be positive, negative or zero).  Consumer j obtains utility jU  if the good
state occurs, and jV  if the bad state occurs, where 0>> jj VU .
Assume the bad state occurs when either consumer j becomes ill or a bad environmental
outcome occurs (e.g., genetic cross-breeding).  Let ( )Ip jlabeled  and ( )Ip j labelednon−  be consumer j’s
perceived probability that the GM-labeled food and plain-labeled food will yield the good state.
Assume the information the consumer has on genetic modification, ( )∞∞− ,~I  affects the
perceived probability that GM-labeled foods will result in a good state.  Large positive I
represents positive or favorable information on GM foods; large negative I  represents negative
or less favorable information on GM foods.  When a consumer gets positive information on GM
foods, I  increases and the consumer perceives greater utility from GM-labeled foods and greater
marginal utility from GM-labeled foods.  The information a consumer receives in our
experiments is randomly assigned, and can differ among participants.  The consumer’s perceived
probability of a good outcome from plain-labeled food does not depend on information about
GM foods.
When equation (3) holds, the consumer is indifferent between purchasing GM-labeled
and plain-labeled foods
(3) )()( MwEUwEU j labelednon
j
labeled −= − .
or:
(3a) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) =−+ wVIpwUIp jjlabeledjjlabeled 1
( ) ( ) ( )MwVpMwUp jj labelednonjj labelednon −−+− −− 1 .
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The consumer prefers GM-labeled foods when the left-hand side of (3a) exceeds the right-hand
side, otherwise he prefers the plain-labeled foods.  In addition, standard comparative statics show
that an increase in positive GM information increases the consumer’s likelihood of consuming
GM-labeled foods by increasing the expected utility of GM-labeled foods:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
I
wVIpwUIp
I
wEU jjlabeled
jj
labeled
j
labeled
∂
∂−+∂
=
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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labeled
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We now define the aggregate demand for GM foods.  Let jlabeledX  represent the quantity
of GM-labeled foods demanded by consumer j.  Assume jlabeledX  is positive for consumers who
prefer GM-labeled foods, and zero otherwise.  We sum the quantity demanded over all
consumers to obtain the aggregate demand for GM-labeled foods:10
(4) =
j
j
labeledlabeled IXAGDEMAND )( .
Assume the population of consumers is heterogeneous in tastes and income such that they can be
grouped as: (i) consumers of GM-labeled products, (ii) consumers who initially consume plain-
labeled foods but switch to GM-labeled product with more positive GM information; and (iii)
consumers of plain-label foods who never switch with positive information.  Now split aggregate
demand for GM-labeled foods into those consumers who initially buy GM-labeled foods and
those who do not:
(4a)  += )()( IXIXAGDEMAND
zeroGM
labeled
buyGM
labeledlabeled .
Taking the derivative of (4a) with respect to information I yields:
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which says that an increase in positive information I increases the aggregate demand for GM-
labeled foods.  The first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the derivative for those who initially
consumed the GM-labeled product, and it can be greater than or equal to zero.  The second term
is the derivative for consumers who do not initially consume GM-labeled foods.  For some
individuals this derivative is zero, and for others, this derivative is positive because they switch.
The second summation term is positive, and the aggregate demand for GM-labeled foods is
increasing in information I.  The opposite result holds for negative information.
We now consider the specific regression analysis used to examine consumer behavior
under diverse information.  The regressions hold consumers’ tastes constant for each of the three
products by making the dependent variable the difference in bid prices for plain-labeled and GM-
labeled products for each participant.  This price difference is derived by taking the difference of
the demand equations for each product in the two trials.  Let the inverse demand equation for the
GM-labeled and plain-labeled food be:
(6) labelednonjj
labelednonlabelednonlabelednon
j XP
−−−− ++= µββ 221
and
(7) labeledjj
labeledlabeledlabeled
j XP µββ ++= 221 .
where Pj represents the price bid for a good by participant j; β1 is an intercept term; Xj2 is a
vector of exogenous variables, and β2 is the associated vector of coefficients.  µj is a zero mean
disturbance term.
Subtracting equation (7) from equation (6), we obtain an equation in which the dependent
variable is the difference in bid prices for the two trials:
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The coefficients and error terms can be condensed and rewritten as:
(8a) *2
*
2
*
1 jj
labeled
j
labelednon
j XPP µββ ++=−− .
The difference in bid prices is explained by an intercept term *1β , a slope term *2β  that is
multiplied by a vector of exogenous characteristics 2jX , and a random error term 
*
jµ .11
Equation (8a) is likely to be censored because a zero bid for the GM-labeled product or
the plain-labeled product or both may occur.  This censoring has four cases (see Figure 7).  Case
(1): consumer j bids a positive amount for both the GM-labeled and the plain-labeled product;
the measured difference in bid prices is the difference between the two bid prices.  Case (2):
consumer j bids zero for the GM-labeled product and a positive amount for the plain-labeled
product.  The “true difference” in bid prices with the censored regression will be greater than the
difference between the two observed bid prices.  This arises because the bids on the GM-labeled
product are censored at zero.  Case (3): consumer j bids a positive amount for the GM-labeled
product and zero for the plain-labeled product.  This is the same as Case (2), the true difference
in bid prices for the censored regression is absolutely larger than the measured difference
between the two bid prices.  Case (4): consumer j bids zero for both products.  This does not give
any information about their true demand for GM products.
A positive aspect of using the censored regression model is that zero bid prices are
correctly accounted for, and effects of bias from the zero bids are minimized.   The disadvantage
is that we must assume a bid price distribution.  Assume the zero bid prices would have followed
a normal distribution, had they not been censored.  Statistical tests are conducted using the
likelihood ratio test statistic (Greene, 2000).12  The large sample distribution of λln2−  is chi-
squared, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed.
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4.  Empirical specification II:  The value of verifiable information
We now define the empirical specification to obtain the value of verifiable information.
We compare the utility gained using the ex post probabilities of harm from GM labeled foods for
those bidders who switched their purchasing behavior with new information.  This approach is
similar to the approach used by Foster and Just (1989) and Teisl et al. (2001).  Because the goods
are nearly perfect substitutes, consumers who receive third-party information on GM foods could
change their relative preferences, but their preferences might not change enough to cause them to
switch to the other good.  As an example, assume a consumer is initially willing to pay $1.00 for
a GM-labeled food product and $2.00 for a plain-labeled food product, and the plain-labeled
food costs $2.00.  Suppose the market-clearing price for the GM-labeled food is $1.60.  The
consumer would initially buy the plain-labeled food.  If third-party information increases the
consumer’s willingness to pay for the GM-labeled product from $1.00 to $1.50, the information
changes the consumer’s relative preference toward GM-labeled food but not enough to make him
switch.  Since the GM-labeled food costs $1.60, he is still better off purchasing the plain-labeled
version of the product.
We evaluate two types of individuals who gain from third-party information.  The first
type is one who purchases GM-labeled foods before he received third-party, verifiable
information, but switches to plain-labeled foods after he receives the third-party information.
The second type purchased plain-labeled foods before the third-party information is introduced,
and then switches to GM-labeled foods after he receives the third-party information.
What is the welfare gain for consumers who switch after verifiable information is
released/provided?  First, let’s look at the welfare gains for a consumer who switches from the
plain-labeled food to the GM-labeled food.  The consumer originally purchases the plain-labeled
17
food, and the surplus the consumer receives from that purchase is the difference between his/her
willingness to pay and the price for the plain-labeled food.  Consumer j’s surplus from
purchasing plain-labeled food or GM-labeled food is shown in (9) and (10):
(9) j labelednon
j
labelednon
j
labelednon PWTPsurplus −−− −=
(10) jlabeled
j
labeled
j
labeled PWTPsurplus −= .
Because we are looking at the case in which a consumer originally purchases plain-
labeled foods, the consumer perceives a greater surplus from consuming the plain-labeled food
than from consuming the GM-labeled food.  For consumers who switch after receiving third-
party information, the surplus from purchasing the GM-labeled food is now greater than the
surplus from purchasing the plain-labeled food.  The welfare gain to the consumers who switch
is the surplus they receive from purchasing the GM-labeled food minus the surplus they would
receive if they purchased the plain-labeled food.  A consumer j’s increase in welfare from third-
party information due to switching from the plain-labeled product to the GM-labeled product:
(11) j labelednon
j
labeled
j
labeled surplussurplusPREMGAIN −−= .
Those consumers who initially purchased the GM-labeled food and then switched to the
plain-labeled food after they received third-party information will also gain.  Their gain will be
the welfare gain from purchasing the plain-labeled foods minus the gain they would have
received if they had purchased GM-labeled foods.  The welfare gain of an individual j who
switches from the GM-labeled product to the plain-labeled product is:
(12) jlabeled
j
labelednon
j
labelednon surplussurplusPREMGAIN −= −− .
Note all consumers enjoy the premium gained by consuming one product instead of
another, as shown in expressions (11) and (12), but the premium gained represents increased
welfare (i.e., the value of information) for those who switch products.  The total welfare gained
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for each product from a third-party source can be computed by summing the welfare gains over
all individuals.  The total value of information is obtained by summing the value of information
for all individuals who switched to GM-labeled foods and all individuals who switched to plain-
labeled foods:
(13) 
∈∈
−
+=
switchedj
j
labeled
switchedj
j
labelednon PREMGAINPREMGAINSUMVAL .
There are three combinations of information a person could have received when no third-
party information is available.  A consumer could have access to only positive information on
GM foods, have access to only negative information on GM foods, or could have access to both
positive and negative information on GM foods.  The gains from third-party information are
computed for each of the three situations.
Three magnitudes are needed to value verifiable information:  (1) the difference in the
marginal percentage who purchase GM-labeled foods after third-party information is introduced;
(2) the value of third-party information to each person who switches; and (3) the average value
of third-party information per person.  These three values will be obtained for individuals in each
of the three information settings (receiving positive information, receiving negative information,
or receiving both positive and negative information).
First, we determine the net change in the percentage of consumers who purchase GM-
labeled foods.  The experimental auction provides data on how much a consumer values the
plain-labeled product and the GM-labeled product, but no information on these prices.  To
compute the value of information, we need an estimate of the prices a consumer would face in
the market.  To do this, we assume that the price for a GM-labeled food is the mean bid price for
that food product across all auction participants, and the price for the plain-labeled food is the
mean bid price for that food product.  Because we are trying to assess the average value of
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information for each product, we will assume that all participants purchase either the GM-labeled
version or the plain-labeled version of a product.  Individuals purchase the product that gives
him/her the greater surplus, as shown in equations (9) and (10).  The net change in the
percentage who purchase the GM-labeled product is the (absolute) difference between the
“percentage who purchase GM-labeled foods when treated to third-party information” and the
“percentage who purchase GM-labeled foods but do not receive third-party information;” given
the other information they have received:
(14) thirdpartynothirdparty GMpercentbuyGMpercentbuytchPercentswi −−= .
For participants who receive only negative information, third-party information should cause
some to switch to GM-labeled foods.  For participants who only receive positive information,
one would expect some to switch to plain-labeled foods.  For consumers who receive both
positive and negative information, it is difficult to predict whether consumers would buy more or
less GM-labeled food when third-party information is given.  The net percentage change is the
absolute value of the difference in the percentage who consume the GM-labeled food with and
without third-party information.
Who switches once third-party information is introduced?  We do not know the particular
individuals who switch, but we do know the percentage of the sample who switched after the
introduction of third-party information.  We assume that the individuals who switched have
relative preferences for GM-labeled foods that are evenly distributed throughout the population
who consume the good that has been switched to.  For example, if third-party information causes
a number of consumers to switch their purchasing habits to consume GM-labeled foods, we will
assume that these consumers who switched have relative valuations of GM-labeled foods that are
evenly distributed throughout the population of consumers who purchase the GM-labeled foods.
20
Second, we estimate the value of third-party information to a person who switches either
to or from the GM-labeled food.  To determine the value of third-party information to a
consumer who switches, we divide the total value of verifiable information, as computed in
equation (13), by the number of consumers who switched products:
(16)
oductswitchedprbuyl N
SUMVAL
lueswitcherva
−
= .
In equation (16), llueswitcherva  is the average value of third-party information to a consumer
that switches his/her purchase of product l  either to or from the GM-labeled food after they
receive the third-party information.  This works because we are assuming the consumers who
switched are evenly distributed throughout the population of consumers. The total value of third-
party information for product l can be obtained by multiplying the average value of third-party
information per switcher by the number of switchers:
(17) switchedll Nlueswitchervatotalvalue ×= .
Then the average value of third-party information for product l can be computed by dividing the
total value of third-party information by the total number of consumers in the population:
(18)
pop
l
l N
totalvalue
rsonavevaluepe = .
In sum, our experimental auction data and econometric design allows us to calculate the
percentage of consumers who switch in each of the information settings: receiving positive
information, receiving negative information, or receiving both positive and negative information.
The average value of third-party information per person who switches will be computed for each
product.  We then estimate an average value of third-party information per consumer in the
population for each product, and then translate this into a total value to the United States.
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5.  Results and Discussion
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the 172 auction participants.
Sixty-two percent of the participants in the auctions were female.  The mean age of a participant
was 49.5 years (a person had to be at least 18 years old to participate).  Two-thirds of the auction
participants were married.  On average, the participants were well educated, with the mean
education level being more than two years in college.  The participants had a mean total
household income (before taxes) of $57,000.  Most of the participants in the experiments were
white (ninety percent), and most people indicated that they read labels before they buy a new
food product.  The demographic characteristics of our participants indicate that our experiments
had a representative sample of the Midwest region of the United States.13
Some participants chose to bid zero in both trials, i. e., for both the GM-labeled and the
plain-labeled variety of a particular food product.  These participants provide no information
about their taste for genetic modification; they were willing to pay zero for one unit, indicating
they had no demand for the particular food product.  Table 2 presents the mean bids for
participants, segregated by information treatment, but does not include bids for consumers who
bid zero for both the GM-labeled and plain-labeled varieties of a product.14  In Table 2, the
number of participants who bid a positive amount for a product is different for each of the three
goods.  This arises because more consumers chose to bid zero for the GM-labeled and plain-
labeled vegetable oils than for the GM-labeled and plain-labeled bags of tortilla chips, and the
fewest number of consumers chose to bid zero for the GM-labeled and plain-labeled bags of
potatoes.  Many consumers who bid zero for both varieties of one product, bid a positive amount
for the other products.15
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The Effect of Diverse Information
Part A of table 2 shows the mean bid prices for all participants.  Consumers, on average,
discounted GM-labeled foods by fourteen percent.  Part B shows that participants who received
only positive information actually put a premium on the GM-labeled food for two of the three
products.  This was despite the fact that the genetic modification was only used to enhance the
production process, and did not give the foods any enhanced attributes.  Part C shows that when
consumers received only negative information, they discount the GM-labeled foods by an
average of approximately thirty-five percent.  Part D shows that consumers who received both
positive and negative information discount the GM-labeled foods by an average of seventeen to
twenty-nine percent, depending on the food product.
Third-party information has an impact on the willingness to pay for GM-labeled foods.
Part E shows that consumers who received positive and third-party information discounted GM-
labeled foods slightly.  This is in contrast to the consumers who received only positive
information who valued the GM-labeled foods more than their plain-labeled counterpart on
average.  Part F shows that participants who received negative and third-party information still
discounted the GM-labeled foods, but by a smaller amount than the participants who received
only negative information.  Part G shows that participants who received negative and third-party
information discounted the GM-labeled foods by an average of seventeen to twenty-two percent,
depending on the product.  Participants who received positive, negative and third-party
information were more accepting of the GM-labeled foods than those who received only positive
and negative information.  The participants who received positive, negative and third-party
information discounted the GM-labeled food by an average of zero to eleven percent, depending
on the product.
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Our results are consistent with Viscusi (1997) who found that individuals placed a
slightly greater weight on negative information than positive information.  In our auction,
participants who received only positive information did not discount the GM-labeled food, while
those who received only negative information discounted the GM-labeled food by an average of
35 percent.  Those who received both positive and negative information put slightly more weight
on the negative information, discounting the GM-labeled foods by 20 percent.  The results here
are in contrast to Fox et al.’s (2001) who obtained the result that negative information dominated
positive information.  They argued that one reason could be due to a “status quo bias,” (or
endowment effect) where participants were originally endowed with a regular pork sandwich and
could bid to upgrade to an irradiated pork sandwich.  Participants may have their bids biased due
to being endowed with one type of sandwich.16  Our auction had participants bid on items in
separate rounds (trials), thus our results are not influenced by a “status quo bias.”
Tables 3, 4, and 5 display the censored regression results.17  For all three goods, models
were fitted using five dummy variables to test for impacts of different information types.
Dummy variables are defined for negative information; negative and positive information;
positive and third party information; negative and third party information; and positive, negative,
and third-party information.  Positive information is the omitted information type from the
reported regression results.  Other regressors include gender, income, a dummy variable
indicating if a person saw the food with GM labels in trial one, and a dummy variable indicating
if the participant perceived themselves to be informed about GM foods.18  These variables allow
us to control for selective demographic characteristics and examine how prior knowledge about
genetically modified foods affects willingness to pay or demand.
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The intercept term is statistically insignificant for all three products.  The coefficients for
the dummy variables indicating that participants received only negative information are large,
positive, and statistically significant.  The coefficients for the dummy variable indicating that an
individual who received positive and negative information is positive and these coefficients are
statistically significant for some of the food products.  These results show individuals who
received only negative or both positive and negative information behaved differently than
individuals who received only positive information when making purchasing decisions.
The coefficients for the dummy variables where an individual received positive and third-
party information are small, positive, and not statistically significant.  Hence, third-party
information does not have a large impact on the difference in bids between the plain-labeled and
GM-labeled foods for participants who received only positive information.
The coefficients for the dummy variables indicating that a participant received negative
and third-party information are generally statistically significant.  The coefficients for the
dummy variables indicating that a participant received all three types of information are not
statistically different from zero for any of the food products.  The impact is not significantly
different from the outcome when consumers received only positive information.
Few demographic variables were found to contribute significantly in explaining bid price
difference for the two trials.  Females discounted GM-labeled foods by less than men for all of
three products in the auctions.  The fact that female consumers discounted GM-labeled foods by
less than men seems contrary to much of the risk perception literature that states that women are
more risk averse.  One explanation is that females on average have more experience shopping for
food than do males.  However, none of the coefficients was statistically significant from zero.
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Those consumers who had higher incomes discounted all three GM-labeled food products
more than those who have lower incomes.  The coefficient is statistically significant for one of
the three products – vegetable oil.  It is not surprising that higher income consumers discounted
GM-labeled foods more heavily.  This is consistent with “food quality” being a luxury good.
Those consumers who considered themselves at least “somewhat informed about GM
foods” (as recorded in the pre-auction survey) discounted GM-labeled foods by more than other
participants.  This coefficient is statistically significant (10% level) for one of the three food
products – Russet potatoes.  Those who perceived themselves to be informed bid far less for the
GM-labeled foods than others.  This result suggests they had heard negative information on GM
foods prior to the experiment.  In all of the censored regression equations, we rejected the null
hypothesis that the explanatory variables included in the regression had no explanatory power (or
all non-intercept coefficients were jointly zero).
The Value of Verifiable Information
We present the value of third-party information for each of the three cases a consumer
could find themselves in: only receiving positive information, only receiving negative
information, and receiving both positive and negative information.  Table 6 presents the value of
information results for the three food products:  the marginal percentage of people who switch,
the value to a person who switches, and the average value to a person in society.
When an individual received only positive information, one would expect third-party
information to cause some individuals to switch to plain-labeled foods.  Our results show that
this is not necessarily the case.  Those consumers who received both positive and third-party
information were more likely to purchase GM-labeled potatoes, but they were less likely to
purchase the GM-labeled tortilla chips than individuals who received only positive information.
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The share of consumers who switched to either of these goods is very small.  The average value
per person from the introduction of third-party information was approximately one-half cent per
product.
While third-party information brought about virtually no change in consumption behavior
for tortilla chips and potatoes, consumers who received positive and third-party information were
much more likely to purchase GM-labeled vegetable oil than consumers who receive only
positive information.  Approximately fifteen percent of the population that received positive
information switched from plain-labeled vegetable oil to GM-labeled vegetable oil after the
introduction of third-party information.  This is consistent with third-party information revealing
that when vegetable oils are refined, there is virtually no genetically modified material left in
vegetable oil even when they are made from genetically engineered soybeans.  For consumers
who are worried about their own health, they now become more likely to purchase GM-labeled
vegetable oil, even if they do not change their attitude towards other GM-labeled products.  The
value per person who switches to the GM-labeled vegetable oil is almost twenty-one cents per
switcher, and the average value per person is just over three cents per bottle.  This is interesting
because consumers who receive third-party information would get virtually no gain from this
information except when purchasing the vegetable oil.  While these are interesting results, very
few participants have heard only positive information about GM foods prior to the experiment.
Therefore, the other two groups; those who received only negative information and those who
received both positive and negative information were probably more representative of the
general population.
We expect that consumers who initially received only negative information on GM foods
but later were given third-party information to be more likely to consume GM-labeled foods.
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The results from the experiments validate this expectation.  For all three products, a significant
portion of the population switched from plain-labeled to the GM-labeled food: 18.6 percent  to
28.2 percent of people switch to the GM-labeled food, depending on the product.  The value of
the third-party information for each person who switches ranges from seventeen to twenty-five
cents per item, depending on the product.
Combining information together, the average consumer gains 4.7 cents per bag of tortilla
chips, 6.7 cents per bottle of vegetable oil, and 4.3 cents per bag of potatoes when they initially
received only negative information and then third-party information is introduced.  Participants
who received positive, negative and third-party information are more likely to purchase GM-
labeled foods than individuals who received only positive and negative information.  The share
of participants who switched from plain-labeled foods to GM-labeled foods is smaller for each of
the three goods in this auction when compared to the participants who received negative
information, but greater for each food than for individuals who receive only positive information.
Only 8.7 percent of participants switched to the GM-labeled tortilla chips, while 15.9
percent and 21.5 percent switched to the GM-labeled vegetable oil and GM-labeled potatoes.
The value per person who switched from the plain-labeled to GM-labeled food ranged from
twenty-three to twenty-nine cents per product.  This leads to an average value per person of 2
cents per bag of tortilla chips, 4.3 cents per bottle of vegetable oil, and 6.3 cents for each bag of
potatoes.
Generalizing the per person value of information in an experiment to the aggregate value
of the U.S. population is risky but instructive, even if only to understand the upper limit on the
value that verifiable information on GM might provide.  On average, the value of verifiable
information is about 4 cents per product for those individuals who have heard either negative
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information or both positive and negative information on GM foods.  Because the prices for
these three food products typically range between $1.50 - $2.50, verifiable information has a
value of approximately 2 percent of the purchase price for products that could be genetically
modified.
Estimates vary for the amount of foods on grocers’ shelves that are GM.  On the lower
end, some observers predict that two thirds of all processed foods in the U.S. contain some GM
material (Davis, 2001); on the upper end, some advocates argue that two thirds of all products in
a grocery store contain GM material (Friends of the Earth, 2001).  We approximate the aggregate
value of verifiable information using the lower estimate, assuming one third of all products on a
grocer’s shelf might be GM.  In 1997, U.S. citizens spent $390 billion for food at home (USDA –
Putnam and Allshouse).  Thus, if one third of all products are GM, Americans spent roughly
$130 billion on foods that could be GM.  If verifiable information has a value of approximately 2
percent of the product’s price, and if one could generalize these results our best estimate is that
verifiable information would be worth about 2.6 billion dollars annually to U.S. consumers.
While large, the aggregate value does not seem totally unrealistic.19  The value of $2.6
billion divided by the number of people in the US gives an average value of approximately $9.00
per year for every man, woman, and child.  Foster and Just found a value of information of
approximately $10.00 per person, per month ($120.00 per year), using the same techniques.
Their study only focused on milk, while our study is examining all consumer foods that might be
genetically modified.
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6.  Concluding Comments
While new food products developed using genetic modification remain controversial, our
results showed that pro-, anti-, and verifiable biotech information have significant impacts on
consumers’ demand for GM-labeled foods..  Our experimental design revealed three key results.
First, information about GM foods from interested parties impacts consumer demand.  This helps
explain why groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have been disseminating
massive amounts of negative information on GM foods.  Although these groups are interested
parties and provide biased information, their information has an impact.  Likewise, it explains
why biotechnology companies have invested heavily to advertise the positive aspects of
biotechnology (Thrane, 2001).  Although these companies are interested parties and provide
biased information, their information has increased the demand for GM-foods-- even in the
presence of negative information.  This is important because previous literature dealing with
other new food products, e.g., irradiated pork, showed that negative information tends to
dominate positive information when both are presented to consumers.
Second, an independent, third-party source that provides verifiable information on GM
foods has a significant impact on consumers’ demand for GM foods.  Third-party information
had its greatest impact on consumers who received negative information, prompting them to
view GM foods more favorably and to increase their demand.
Finally, through a new method developed to determine the value of information, it was
shown that third-party information on GM foods could have a value of $2.6 billion per year to
U.S consumers. Although this number may seem large to some readers, we believe that it is a
lower bound estimates because the anti-biotechnology lobby have in some cases been successful
in getting such large reductions in the demand for GM products that they have been removed
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from the shelves of grocery stores.  This type of holdup outcome would have much greater
welfare costs than the marginal effects of information that we have estimated.  A second reason
why $2.5 billion is an underestimate of social value of verifiable information is that this
information has international public good attributes (Huffman and Tegene 2002).  Therefore, the
total social value of verifiable information is potentially much larger than our estimate.  Because
of the large social value of verifiable information on GM food and the unlikelyhood that another
country will provide it, i.e., free-rider problem among affected countries (Huffman and Tegene
2002), the United States should develop a new third-party institution, separate from the federal
government, to oversee the provision of this information.  Resources to support this activity,
however, seem most likely to come from federal tax collections because of the free-rider
problem within the United States.
Much research remains to be done on this topic.  New research is currently testing the
impact of information on the willingness to pay for foods with “negative GM-labels,” labels that
say “this product is not made using genetic engineering.”  Additional research is needed to
determine how a regulatory body that supplies third-party, verifiable information on GM foods
could be established, and how much this type of regulatory process would cost.
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Figure 1: Steps in the experiment
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
        Step 4
Step 6
Step 5
                    Step 7 Step 8
        Step 9 Step 10
Fills consent form and
questionnaire, receives
$40 and I.D. number
Nth-price auction
is explained
Candy Bar
Auction
Auction of a candy
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and a box of pens
Binding practice round
and binding nth prices
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Pro-biotechnology
Anti-biotechnology
Both Pro and Anti-
biotechnology
Pro–biotechnology and
third-party information
Anti–biotechnology and
third-party information
Both Pro and Anti–
biotechnology and third-
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First round of bidding
on food products
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Figure 2: Labels used for the three food items
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM)
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made Thursday April 5th
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM)
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made Thursday April 5th
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
This product is made using
genetically modified (GM) soybeans
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
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 Figure 3:  Information given to participants.  Anti-biotechnology shock
The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group.
General Information
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources
today.  There are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly
because unknown adverse effects could be catastrophic!  Inadequate safety testing of GM plants,
animals, and food products has occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM
foods are safe.  Consumers should not have to test new food products to ensure that they are safe.
Scientific Impact
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into
another.  This process is very risky.  The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM)
foods is the unknown.  This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that
consumers will not be harmed.  Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that
there would be no harm to consumers over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were
wrong.  We do not want consumers to be harmed by GM food.
Human Impact
Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems.  The potential exists for
allergens to be transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect.  For example, if
genes from a peanut were transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats
this new tomato, they could display a peanut allergy.
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue.  These foods are
taking genes from one living organism and transplanting them into another.  Many people think
it is morally wrong to mess around with life forms on such a fundamental level.
Financial Impact
GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about
their own profits and ignore possible negative side effects.  These groups are actually patenting
different life forms that they genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future.  Studies
have also shown that GM crops may get lower yields than conventional crops.
Environmental Impact
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards.  Sparse testing of
GM plants for environmental impacts has occurred.  One potential hazard could be the impact of
GM crops on wildlife.  One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies.
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM
plants that were engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application.  The harmful insects and
other pests that get exposed to these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of
the potential advantages of GM pest resistance.
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Figure 4: Information given to participants, pro-biotechnology shock
The following is collection of statements and information on genetic modification
provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.
General Information
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest
discoveries in the history of farming.  Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and
disease resistance and weed control. These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology
lead to reduced cost of food production.  Future GM food products may have health benefits.
Scientific Impact
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Genetic engineering has brought new
opportunities to farmers for pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient
enhanced foods. GM plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in
the history of agriculture.  We have just seen the tip of the iceberg of future potential.
Human Impact
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous.  A special type of rice
called “golden rice” has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A.  This could
be very helpful because the disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world
countries.  VAD causes irreversible blindness in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible
for over one million deaths annually.  Since rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of
people in the third world, Golden Rice has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by
reducing the cases of VAD.
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have been
consuming GM foods for years.  While every food product may pose risks, there has never been
a documented case of a person getting sick from GM food.
Financial Impact
Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means
lower food prices, and that can help feed the world.  In America, lower food prices help decrease
the number of hungry people and also lets consumers save a little more money on food.
Worldwide the number of hungry people has been declining, but increased crop production using
GM technology can also help further reduce world hunger.
Environmental Impact
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical
insecticide application by 50 percent or more.  This means less environmental damage.  GM
weed control is providing new methods to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till
farming.  Genetic modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally
helpful discoveries ever.
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Figure 5:  Information given to participants, independent, verifiable information
The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group,
consisting of a variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics.  These parties have no financial stake
in genetically modified foods.
General Information
Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants
or animals, a process that would not otherwise occur (In common usage, genetic modification
means bioengineering).  With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat
similar to the process of how a flu shot works in the human body.  Flu shots work by injecting a
virus into the body to help make a human body more resistant to the flu.  Bioengineered plant-
pest resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest resistance.
Scientific Impact
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals,
potatoes, etc.) is based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although
they have been modified slightly from the original plant materials.
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removed
essentially all the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils.  So even if GM crops were
deemed to be harmful for human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause
harm.
Human Impact
 While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocers’
shelf, there are currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has increased
nutrient content.
All foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people.  No FDA approved
GM food poses any known unique human health risks.
Financial Impact
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek
profits.  For farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch.  However,
genetic modification technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business
industry and farming.  The introduction of GM foods has the potential to decrease the prices to
consumers for groceries.
Environmental Impact
The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown.
Bioengineered insect resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environmentally hazardous
insecticides.  More studies are occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and
organisms on the environment.  A couple of studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from
GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the results. The possibility of insects
growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate concern.  
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Figure 6: Information and labeling given to experimental units one through twelve
Exp. unit Positive/negative Third-party Round with GM labels
1. Pro-biotech Yes 1
2. Anti-biotech Yes 1
3. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 1
4. Pro-biotech Yes 2
5. Anti-biotech Yes 2
6 Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 2
7 Pro-biotech No 1
8 Anti-biotech No 1
9. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech No 1
10. Pro-biotech No 2
11. Anti-biotech No 2
12. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech No 2
Figure 7: The four cases of the censored regression
Case Plain-labeled bid GM-labeled bid Censored Regression Difference
1. labelednonP − labeledP labeledlabelednon PP −−
2. labelednonP − 0 labelednonP −>
3. 0 labeledP labeledP−<  or labeledP−>
4. 0 0 .
. represents a missing value, due to the zero bids.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Auction Participants
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev
Gender 1 if female 0.62 0.49
Age The participant’s age 49.5 17.5
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.67 0.47
Education Years of schooling 14.54 2.25
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.78 1.65
Income The households income level (in thousands) 57.0 32.6
White 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.30
Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.01 0.11
1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.31
1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.37 0.48
1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.20 0.40
Informed 1 if an individual considered themselves at least somewhat
informed regarding genetically modified foods
0.42 0.49
Labels1 1 if the treatment bid on foods with GM labels in round 1 0.52 0.50
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Table 2.  Mean bids for people, excludes double-zero bids
A. Mean bids – all participants
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 146 1.07 0.81 0.99 0 3.99
OIL 146 1.24 0.78 1.00 0 3.79
GM CHIPS 155 1.03 0.85 0.99 0 3.99
CHIPS 155 1.20 0.81 1.00 0.05 4.99
GM POTATOES 159 0.84 0.66 0.75 0 3
POTATOES 159 0.98 0.65 0.89 0 3.89
B. Mean bids when participants only received positive information.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 26 1.56 0.73 1.50 0 2.99
OIL 26 1.54 0.79 1.55 0 3.50
GM CHIPS 30 1.31 0.72 1.13 0 2.99
CHIPS 30 1.36 0.72 1.18 0.05 2.99
GM POTATOES 27 1.30 0.71 1.25 0 2.50
POTATOES 27 1.26 0.67 1.25 0 2.00
C. Mean bids when participants only received negative information.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 26 0.79 0.82 0.50 0 3.25
OIL 26 1.22 0.65 1.00 0.25 2.49
GM CHIPS 29 0.81 0.94 0.50 0 3.99
CHIPS 29 1.25 1.02 1.00 0.05 4.99
GM POTATOES 29 0.61 0.68 0.50 0 2.75
POTATOES 29 0.98 0.88 0.75 0.05 3.89
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D. Mean bids when participants received both positive and negative information.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 24 0.68 0.55 0.50 0 1.79
OIL 24 0.90 0.72 0.85 0 3.00
GM CHIPS 23 0.68 0.74 0.35 0 2.25
CHIPS 23 0.81 0.79 0.49 0.05 2.75
GM POTATOES 26 0.50 0.39 0.50 0 1.50
POTATOES 26 0.70 0.43 0.50 0.05 1.60
E. Mean bids when participants received both positive and third-party information.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 26 1.12 0.62 1.00 0 2.39
OIL 26 1.14 0.57 1.00 0.10 2.39
GM CHIPS 25 1.24 0.77 1.19 0 2.79
CHIPS 25 1.33 0.73 1.16 0.20 2.89
GM POTATOES 26 0.92 0.45 0.99 0 1.85
POTATOES 26 0.93 0.39 0.99 0.25 1.90
F. Mean bids when participants received both negative and third-party information.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 21 1.33 1.05 1.25 0 3.99
OIL 21 1.60 0.97 1.50 0.49 3.79
GM CHIPS 25 1.12 0.97 0.99 0 3.50
CHIPS 25 1.38 0.77 1.01 0.49 3.00
GM POTATOES 27 0.89 0.77 0.89 0 3.00
POTATOES 27 1.14 0.67 0.99 0.50 3.00
G. Mean bids when participants received positive, negative and third party information.
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 23 0.94 0.77 0.95 0 2.75
OIL 23 1.06 0.82 1.00 0.05 3.29
GM CHIPS 23 0.95 0.81 0.85 0 3.25
CHIPS 23 0.95 0.66 0.99 0.1 2.89
GM POTATOES 24 0.82 0.61 1.00 0 1.99
POTATOES 24 0.84 0.55 0.84 0.01 2.00
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Table 3. Censored Regression Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-
labeled and plain-labeled tortilla chips
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food – bid price GM-labeled food
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pro 0.060 0.093 0.106 0.008 0.039 -0.034
(0.099) (0.110) (0.119) (0.137) (0.119) (0.151)
Anti 0.481 ** 0.473 ** 0.474 ** 0.481 ** 0.489 ** 0.494 **
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144)
Pro and Anti 0.132 0.124 0.128 0.138 0.136 0.147
(0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153)
Pro and Third-party 0.035 0.031 0.035 0.003 0.023 0.001
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) (0.148)
Anti and Third-party 0.245 * 0.241 0.246 ** 0.244 * 0.241 0.256 *
(0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148)
All information -0.027 -0.023 -0.019 0.003 -0.028 -0.009
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
Labels-Round 1 -0.063 -0.063 -0.064 -0.045 -0.050
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
Gender -0.025 -0.011
(0.091) (0.091)
Income 0.0017 0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Informed 0.104 0.087
(0.092) (0.093)
Likelihood ratio test 15.92 ** 16.28 ** 16.49 ** 17.93 ** 17.70 ** 18.83 **
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5%
*   indicates that a variable is significant at 10%
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Table 4. Censored Regression Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-
labeled and plain-labeled vegetable oil.
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food – bid price GM-labeled food
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.032 0.053 0.117 -0.128 -0.015 -0.104
(0.126) (0.142) (0.150) (0.169) (0.152) (0.180)
Anti 0.530 ** 0.496 ** 0.504 ** 0.505 ** 0.516 ** 0.529 **
(0.180) (0.181) (0.180) (0.179) (0.181) (0.178)
Pro and Anti 0.259 0.231 0.262 0.255 0.250 0.295
(0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181)
Pro and Third-party 0.061 0.046 0.079 -0.012 0.032 0.014
(0.179) (0.178) (0.179) (0.178) (0.177) (0.179)
Anti and Third-party 0.335 * 0.301 0.338 * 0.288 0.312 * 0.333 *
(0.190) (0.191) (0.192) (0.188) (0.190) (0.189)
All information 0.186 0.181 0.204 0.208 0.170 0.218
(0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.182) (0.184) (0.182)
Labels-Round 1 -0.139 -0.136 -0.149 -0.115 -0.127
(0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.108)
Gender -0.140 -0.131
(0.111) (0.109)
Income 0.0032 * 0.0029 *
(0.0017) (0.0017)
Informed 0.142 0.112
(0.113) (0.112)
Likelihood ratio test 10.90 * 12.52 * 14.11 ** 16.21 ** 14.09 ** 18.63 **
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5%
*   indicates that a variable is significant at 10%
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Table 5. Censored Regression Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-
labeled and plain-labeled potatoes.
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food – bid price GM-labeled food
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.039 0.064 0.076 -0.019 -0.029 -0.069
(0.088) (0.096) (0.103) (0.117) (0.101) (0.124)
Anti 0.504 ** 0.470 ** 0.472 ** 0.478 ** 0.501 ** 0.507 **
(0.125) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120) (0.120)
Pro and Anti 0.262 ** 0.233 * 0.239 * 0.248 ** 0.258 ** 0.271 **
(0.126) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123)
Pro and Third-party 0.057 0.041 0.046 0.018 0.026 0.015
(0.125) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.120) (0.122)
Anti and Third-party 0.339 ** 0.323 ** 0.329 ** 0.322 ** 0.332 ** 0.337 **
(0.125) (0.123) (0.124) (0.122) (0.120) (0.122)
All information 0.088 0.095 0.099 0.110 0.078 0.092
(0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.124)
Labels-Round 1 -0.174 ** -0.174 ** -0.177 ** -0.146 ** -0.150**
(0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Gender -0.026 -0.022
(0.075) (0.074)
Income 0.0014 0.0009
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Informed 0.190 ** 0.179 **
(0.074) (0.075)
Likelihood ratio test 22.54 ** 28.17 ** 28.29 ** 29.69 ** 34.56 ** 35.36 **
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5%
*   indicates that a variable is significant at 10%
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Table 6.  Value of third-party, independent information on genetically modified foods.
A. Value to participants who receive positive information*
Percent who switch to GM Value per switcher Average value per person
Tortilla Chips - 3.3% $0.108/bag $0.004/bag
Vegetable Oil 15.4% $0.209/bottle $0.032/bottle
Potatoes 3.3% $0.183/bag $0.006/bag
B. Value to participants who receive negative information**
Percent who switch to GM Value per switcher Average value per person
Tortilla Chips 18.6% $0.250/bag $0.047/bag
Vegetable Oil 28.2% $0.236/bottle $0.067/bottle
Potatoes 25.0% $0.172/bag $0.043/bag
C. Value to participants who receive both positive and negative information***
Percent who switch to GM Value per switcher Average value per person
Tortilla Chips 8.7% $0.233/bag $0.020/bag
Vegetable Oil 15.9% $0.276/bottle $0.043/bottle
Potatoes 21.5% $0.293/bag $0.063/bag
*  On average, more individuals purchased the GM-labeled potatoes and GM-labeled
vegetable oil when they received positive and verifiable information as opposed to just getting
positive information, but fewer individuals purchased the GM-labeled tortilla chips than their
plain-labeled counterpart when they received positive and verifiable information.
**  Consumers who received negative and verifiable information were more accepting of
GM foods than individuals who only received negative information
***  Consumers who received positive, negative, and verifiable information were more
accepting of GM foods than individuals who only received positive and negative information
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1 This is in contrast to the tradition in experimental economics of having an individual participate
in multiple trials.  See Shogren (forthcoming).
2 When two adults in a household participated, the Iowa State Statistics Laboratory talked to both
of them separately to obtain a commitment to participate and they were told that they would be
assigned to different groups.
3 The complete set of information given to participants is available upon request from the author.
4 For a more detailed description of the benefits of the random nth price auction, see Shogren et
al. (2001) or Huffman et al. (2001).
5 If one assumes that there is little or no income effect from the deck of cards and box of pens,
the two bids on the candy bar should be the same.  The reason is that since the deck of cards and
box of pens are neither complements nor substitutes to the candy bar, they should not impact the
bids on the candy bar. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that the bids for the candy bars
are not significantly different in the two rounds, with a test statistic of 0.03.  This result does not
contradict the notion that the subjects’ bidding behavior was reasonable.
6 When a participant received both pro-biotechnology and anti-biotechnology information, the
order was randomized, so that some participants received the pro-biotechnology information
first, and others received the anti-biotechnology information first.
7 When third-party information was distributed, it always was distributed after the other
information sources.
8 These experiments were set up to minimize endowment effects. i. e., participants were endowed
at the beginning of the experiment with $40 but not GM-food.  See Shogren (forthcoming) for
evidence on endowment effects.
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9 Each individual consumer chooses between GM-labeled and plain-labeled foods, which are
technically described as having a linear indifference curve.  Assuming away the possibility that
the budget constraint line lies exactly on the consumer’s linear indifference curve, if the
consumer purchases multiple quantities of the same product, all of the purchases will be the GM-
food or all of the product will be the non-GM food.
10 Assume no non-pecuniary external effect across consumers occurs.
11 Because no bid prices are revealed until all bids are placed and participants in a trial were
restricted from talking with each other, there is no contemporaneous correlation of random
disturbance terms across participants in a trial.
12 The likelihood ratio takes the maximum of the likelihood function of a regression that only has
an intercept term (the restricted equation) divided by the maximum of the likelihood function of
the regression that includes some explanatory variables (the unrestricted equation).  This is
shown in the following equation:
U
R
L
L
ˆ
ˆ
=λ .
In this equation, RLˆ  represents the maximum of the likelihood function for the regression with
only the intercept term, and ULˆ  represents the maximum of the likelihood function for the
unrestricted equation.
13Demographic information for both the St. Paul area (Ramsey County) and the city of Des
Moines can be found at Midwest Profiles, at http://www.profiles.iastate.edu/.
14The percentage discount of foods is similar to the percentage when all bids are included.
15Only 7 out of the 172 participants bid zero for all six products.
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16 Recall that our participants are only given money and no physical commodity, and this
minimizes the endowment effects.
17OLS regressions were also filled to 172 observations and with the observations remaining after
“double-zero” bids sere excluded.  The results for these regressions are similar, and are available
from the authors upon request.
18Several other models were fitted which included as regressors, the participant’s age, marital
status, religious upbringing, and educational attainment.  None of these variables, however,
impacted the difference in bid prices in a statistically significant way (at the ten-percent level).
19One could argue that this estimated might underestimate value for two reasons.  First, we
presume people who did not change their consumption habits of genetic modification get no
value from new information.  This is a restrictive assumption, as some people may feel better
about their consumption if verifiable information confirms that they were making the correct
choices, relative to their preferences.  Second, we are considering the aggregate value to U.S.
consumers only.  But this information would also be freely available to people in foreign
countries who make up 19/20th of the world population, which implies more aggregate value for
the GM information.
